Re-starting this
blog is becoming a habit; it’s very nearly an annual event. Apparently, we
can’t get through a full 12-month round without dozing off, going on the run, emigrating,
being eaten by lions, or getting distracted by shiny things. Nevertheless, it’s time to wake up, wipe the soup from our eyebrows,
take the lion off our leg, and settle down to – oh look, a magpie.
Quite a lot has
happened of late and, what’s more, we have quite a lot of interesting things to
lay before the reader this time around. Before we get to all that, however, I
should like to begin the new season by picking up on something from one of the
last posts of 2018; the very last, in fact. I planned to do so at the time, but
now I’m rather glad I didn’t. Since then, the thought has been percolating,
which has led me to consider a possible inconsistency in my basic philosophical
position.
The post is James Beauregard’s ‘Human Dignity: Recent Developments’
(12/08/18) and the something in question is Dr B’s reference to ‘Democratic
politicians favouring abortion’. At the time, I was simply going to point out
the very loaded nature of that phrase, the implied division between those who
are for abortion and those who are against it. This, I suspect, is a common
mis-characterisation.
Of course, no one, or almost no one, is actually for abortion per se. No one except me and even then, only for specific
individuals and always and postnatally.
However, if our intention is to frame the whole thing in intractably
antagonistic terms, then this is the way
to do. Similarly, we might talk of those who are in favour of institutionalised misogyny and the socio-political
oppression of women and those who aren’t. Or Catholics and normal people. In neither
case will we do anything to resolve the central problem or even promote
sensible, grown-up discussion. We will start
a row but, just possibly, that’s the point.
As it happens, I have no real interest in rowing. My view of the
whole abortion ‘debate’ – in case any one is interested – is that my half of
the species has had far too much to say on the matter as it is. It doesn’t
directly affect us, yet we presume to decide. I don’t say that men should be prohibited
from having a view on abortion, but I do say that both the discussion and the
decision should be handed over to women, for whom, very obviously, it is a more
practical and potentially urgent issue. Women deal with the consequences in
every possible way; their voices alone should be heard. The role of men, by
contrast, is to listen quietly to all that is said, to proffer an opinion if and only if explicitly invited, and
then with proper humility.
The main reason for bringing this up now is, as suggested, because
it got me thinking about my own philosophical position and whether it’s as
consistent and coherent as I like to think it is.
The position in question concerns what I am reasonably certain is the
metaphysical bottom-line when it comes to being human; more properly, it’s
about what it means to be human, what
it means to be a person. That meaning
lies in the fundamentally social reality of persons. Essentially,
metaphysically, ontologically, logically psychologically, epistemologically,
and in every other way conceivable, human beings are connatural with others. We
are born into and out of concrete relations, our every conception of ourselves
and one another, indeed, of selfhood or personhood at all, is learned from and
within these relations. In Buberian and Macmurrian style, the basic unit of
human existence is I-Thou and this is
so, if I may quote The Sisters of Mercy, First
and Last and Always.
Just to clarify, the social self is only metaphysical in that it is
basic or primitive. It is anti-metaphysical
insofar as it rebuts absolutely the inertia of traditional, solid-state
metaphysics and is grounded in empirical, which is to say, experiential evidence.
A crucial element of this anti-metaphysical metaphysics is the role
of the other. Others constitute the self: they teach us to be people, to act
and to think in all the ways we actually do act and think. In a sense, that is,
the self is the other internalised and returned, re-enacted. That’s how we
learn about morality: by ‘putting ourselves in one another’s place’ and
re-enacting that place, filtered or refracted through our own developing sense
of self. To put it slightly differently, human beings are essentially
dialectical.
One very common reaction, at this point, is to caricature the whole
thing as some form of act or process reductionism: to read it as saying, we are
nothing but social relations or
actions or processes, or what have you; to insist, in short, that it leaves no
room for the individual. That’s a very analytic reaction and, more often than
not, a very American one. Friends and colleagues from the US seem particularly wary
of any shift away from the primacy of the individual, which is not, perhaps,
entirely surprising. It is wrong, however. Understand the logic of
intentionality correctly and you will find plenty of room for the individual.
That, however, is beside the point, which for present purposes concerns
the emphasis on the role of the other. And yet, when it comes abortion, I am
firmly convinced that it is ultimately for the woman to choose or not to choose,
thereby privileging the mother over the foetus. It doesn’t follow from this
that I don’t regard the foetus as a person or as lacking in all the rights
thereof. As it happens, I don’t
regard the foetus as a person, at least not in the same sense as the mother,
but neither do I think that this is an essential or necessary feature of the
argument. Following Judith Jarvis Thomson, I think we can happily grant the
foetus the full suite of human rights, without altering the requirement to
recognise the mother as primary or undermining the argument in favour of
heeding her choice.
And there’s the rub. In privileging the mother over the foetus, am I
simply reiterating the very individualism (socio-political and metaphysical) that I’ve been trying to overcome? Does all this
just boil down to the same old slogan: The Mother’s Right to Choose! To be honest, I’m not sure. If it is, then the
whole debate might be completely irresolvable after all. There just doesn’t
seem to be a fair way to resolve competing rights in a situation like this;
‘first come, first served’ isn’t going to cut it when we’re talking about life
and death. Also, rights are a social construct, they belong to the societies
which legislate to protect them. I which case, we might as well just go with
who shouts loudest.
Having said as much, I will also say that I don’t think this is a capitulation to
individualism and talk about rights. I think
that my reason for privileging the mother over the foetus comes down to
something a bit more basic: specifically, whether we treat others as people or objects.
By ignoring the mother’s choice, whether in the particular instance
or the wider conversation, whether by legislation or force – and America in
particular seems to be keen on using both; though they are in no way alone in
this – we are treating her, not as a person in her own right, but as a thing. Or let’s say, potentially
treating her as a thing. After all, we might more accurately be said to be
treating her as a function of male
sexuality, male desire, male understandings of reproduction. Or we might simply
be infantilising her, treating her as a potential
person (whatever that means) who is not – and according to our
gender-definitions never will be – in a position to make her own decisions or
stake any claim to self-determination, her own body, etc.. My suspicion,
though, is that we’re just treating her as an object: a pot or receptacle for
the life-giving baby batter (as well as a lot of emotional stuff like
self-hatred, anger, fear, impotence, and so on).
In case anyone happens by who struggles to appreciate why bad things
are bad unless they impact on everybody, objectifying 52% of the population
really is bad for everyone, because when I objectify you, I objectify myself.
If it is true that selfhood is a reflection – more accurately, a refraction – of the other, that my self is constituted by the other, then an other that is an object – even or especially
if I determine them as such – can itself only
constitute another it-object. To put
it a little bit more simply, the projection is reflexive insofar as it reflects
back upon me and so constitutes me as projecting-object. Even more simply, part
of what it means to be a person is to treat other people as people; fail to do
that and we undermine our own ‘personhood’. Perhaps that’s one reason why
misogyny and racism are so appalling: they undermine our capacity to be human. In effect, they depopulate the
world.
That, in a highly condensed nutshell is why I think my interpersonal, inter-relational, social, anti-metaphysical
metaphysic of persons doesn’t simply collapse into old-fashioned and
essentialist individualism at the first whiff of a real, practical problem. Still,
it’s worth thinking about.
Nota bene: I should like
it to be noted – and to get all possible credit for doing so -- that I
restricted my choice of euphemisms for semen to ‘baby batter’ when I could, at
the very least, have used ‘erectoplasm’, ‘gentleman’s relish’, ‘schnizzle
drizzle’ or even ‘love custard’. You are welcome.