Pay it Forward: Some Brief Thoughts on the Rights and Duties of a Social Self

by Simon Smith

Talk of Human Rights is very much the lingua franca of international moral and political discourse. Such talk, however, faces serious challenges. According to John Searle, the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights failed to appreciate an important logical connection between rights and duties. Rights imply duties; someone must, therefore, be responsible for honouring those rights, whether to free speech or adequate living standards. Consequently, any declaration of rights must specify who bears the corresponding obligations. Fail to do so, and the assertion of rights is at best wishful thinking – a case of ‘wouldn’t it be nice if everyone had these rights?’ – and at worst meaningless.

The underlying issue here concerns the demand for universality. One might, for instance, argue that the members of a society are obliged to maintain adequate living standards for all. Human rights thereby become part of the social contract tradition. That, however, exchanges universal rights for those recognised by a given society. Thus, if the right to free speech is not recognised then there is no right to free speech in that society. Human rights are no longer simply human; they are relative to particular societies. Clearly, however, this goes against both the spirit and the letter of universal declaration.

To resolve this, we must identify the grounds for universality. Appealing to divine will here is notoriously problematic, not least because it fails to answer the central question: ‘what is it about being human that justifies the demand for rights?’ This, too, is notoriously difficult. Answers often take the form of a list of capacities, allegedly essential to the assignment of humanity. This, however, raises further questions; primarily, ‘what to do about the numerous exceptions?’ Their mistake, I suggest, is the redundant effort to say what a human being is. Identification is easy: I have a prime example in myself. The real question is, ‘how did I become human?’ The answer is simple: I was taught, was I not? Others gave me the moral and intellectual tools from which I construct my identity and with which I participate in the construction of others. This is heart of the matter: humanity is a social product, the creative involvement of one person in the development of others. Here we find a secure foundation for rights: not in what I am owed but in what I owe others. The social reality of human being places serious obligations on me. In order to bear that humanity, I must recognise my obligations to those who taught me and those I teach. These obligations cannot be limited to immediate relations, however, nor by national and racial boundaries. They are genuinely universal. My humanity is connatural: it depends on recognising all others as like myself: equally co-dependent where ever and in whatever circumstances they live. That, I suggest, supplies the grounds for human rights and, moreover, clearly assigns corresponding duties to us all.