Sunday, 8 March 2020

Challenging Anthropocentrism: Ethical Parity in Material Relations

by Denis Larrivee

26-28 of February 2020, Vatican City: the Vatican's Pontifical Academy for Life sponsored a conference on the social, ethical, and anthropological issues raised by Artificial Intelligence technologies. Contributing was Denis Larrivee with a poster discussing novel ethical models that normatively equate technical systems with the human being.

Introduction – Revising a Human-Centered Ethics through Techne Anthropology


Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, synthetic biology, and brain organoids are only a few of many technological achievements likely to alter not only the relation between human beings and technology but also how the human being is himself understood or even altered. This reality has prompted frequent reference to the passing of an age of unfettered technological advance to the beginning of an age of ethical alignment, where the metric of progress is no longer technological capability but human fulfilment. “We need to make sure that these technologies are aligned to humans in terms of our moral values and ethical principles [1].” These Aristotelian and other similar concepts attribute to the human being a value centrality premised on his subjectivity, capacity for morality, and autonomy in the pursuit of the good [2,3]. Paralleling technical advance, however indeed an outcome of it  are challenged to this centrality. These have raised questions about the value structures and ethical systems that flow from human privileging and whether these can and should be replaced in keeping with the enhanced technical capabilities and new material understanding. Current proposals often invoke, for example, a horizontal rather than hierarchical notion of value placement, in which ethical parity is equivalently shared rather than imposed. These proposals premise value contingency on an ‘exceptionless’ criterion that is ontologically neutral and that appeals to a universal techne anthropology. Human ‘exceptionlessness’, however, is itself increasingly challenged by neuroscience at organismal levels of control, revealing the influence of a natural order oriented toward autonomy, self-awareness, and ontological identification. This poster explores the consequences of techne anthropology for ethical theory, ethical praxis, and the ethical subject and posits that its derivative ethical systems fail to account for this natural order and the ontological distinctiveness intrinsic to the human being, who is physically instantiated in global neural operation.

Ethics in an Absence of The Natural Order

Ethical and Philosophical Challenges to Anthropocentrism
Tacitly acknowledged in most research initiatives is an ethical imperative that prioritizes the value of the human being. Termed anthropocentrism, its prioritization places human beings at the apex of organismal life and grounds ethical praxis, thereby promoting human flourishing and restricting harmful interventions. Anthropocentrism, however, has been challenged ethically, for its perceived placement of value in human beings alone [4, 5], and philosophically, as an adequate account of reality [6,7]. Table 1 identifies the major current and historically recent challenges to anthropocentrism, their features and ethical consequences, and movements endorsing their objections. 


Imposing an Order of Techne

The Universality of Techne Anthropology
‘…the doctrine that man is a machine was argued most forcefully in 1751 by de La Mettrie….suggesting there may be no clear distinction between living matter and dead matter…Yet, in spite of the victory of the new quantum theory….the doctrine that man is a machine has perhaps more defenders than before among physicists, biologists, and philosophers; especially in the form of the thesis that man is a computer…’ 
Karl Popper, 1978



Invoking Natural Reality in Value Origins

Addressing the Philosophical Challenge through Neuroscience
Classically, value theory posits that values are situated in a metaphysics of being, populated by entities that are the subject of a predication of qualitative properties. The human being is thereby regarded as an ontologically constitutive, value locus. The ability to manipulate matter, however, has disrupted the association between being and ontology, a conceptual process initiated in Bacon’s and, later, Heidegger’s metaphysics of being. This rupture is reflected in the attribution of value to consciousness (by Derek Parfit) and phenomenology of the emotions (by Eric Scheler) in isolation from the individual. However, neuroscience now shows that cognitive operations emerge from an ontologically constituted entity, the individual, who is instantiated through the mediation of globally directed brain states. These observations reveal that neural organization is governed by metaphysical principles of individuation and qualification; that is, according to a classical metaphysics of being. Hence, in a metaphysics of neuroscience, value contingency rests in the individual as a neurally qualified entity and is differentiated by ontological qualification. Human beings, thereby, occupy the apex of a value hierarchy. Value relations, accordingly, are seen to be structured with respect to oneself, e.g. in the presence of self circuits, [9,10] and between distinguishable entities, e.g. Theory of Mind [11,12]. Intentionalized value relations are maximal when both objects are subjectively aware and are entities in their own right; that is, as individuals with subjectivity and ontological parity. Subject object relations, on the other hand, lack value parity because they exhibit a partial or absence of reciprocity. This value hierarchy is reflected in the physical instantiation of normative relations, seen in many neuroscientific findings extending along a descending hierarchy of value from the greatest (subject-subject) to the least (subject-object). Table 2 illustrates how neuroscientific findings conform to these basic metaphysical influences that shape normative relations in the world.

An Ethics of Enlightened Stewardship:
Ontology in the Natural Order

Ethical parity models presuppose the structuring of lateral and mutually influential normative relations between humans and multiple, technically generated ‘entities’ that share subsets of human properties. On the basis of this last, parity models extend Kant’s Categorical Imperative, adopting a Kingdom of Ends formulation that posits that no entity may be instrumentally used as a means by another - e.g., certain forms of ecoethics [4] - that is, all are invested with equivalent value. Yet the reciprocal and mutual imposition of value does not account for how value is contingent, who can invest it, and what can be done with it. By contrast, relating value to being, that is, to observable reality - evidenced in a metaphysical order revealed by neuroscience, for example - evokes a moral response of ethical supervision that is consistent with external reality []. This model prioritizes the normative position of human beings, but in the context of a metaphysically informed stewardship, that endorses an intrinsic hierarchy of naturally invested values. 

Accepting an Order of Nature

The Order of Nature vs the Order of Biology
‘…the expressions ‘the order of nature’ and ‘the biological order’ must not be confused as identical…biological order is part of that universal empiricism that weighs so heavily on the mind of modern man…and is a product of the human intellect which abstracts its elements from a larger reality….’ 
John Paul II, 1981 

References
[1] Ethically Aligned Design, First Edition: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems. IEEE Standards Association, 2017
[2] Kant I (1993). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. By Ellington JW. Hackett Press.
[3] Wojtyla K (2011) Man in the Field of Responsibility. Trans. Kemp KW. South Bend, IN: St Augustine’s Press.
[4] Latour B (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[5] Chandler D (2013) The world of attachment: the post-humanist challenge to freedom and necessity Millennium J Inter Studies 41(3):516-534.
[6] Rae G (2014) Heidegger’s influence on posthumanism: the destruction of metaphysics, technology, and the overcoming of anthropocentrism. His Human Sci 27(1):51-69.
[7] Levy N (2011) Neuroethics and the Extended Mind In Sahakian B, Illes J (eds) Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[8] Gillett C (2016) Reductionism and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[9] Damasio A (2012) Self comes to mind: constructing the conscious brain. Pantheon Books, New York
[10] Carroll J (2012) The truth about fiction: biological reality and imaginary lives. Style 46:129-160
[11] Decety J, Cowell JM (2014) Friends or foes: is empathy necessary for moral behavior. Perspectives Psychol 9(5):525-537.
[12] Esfeld M (2004) Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations. Studies Hist Phil Modern Physics 35:601-617.
[13] Rhonheim M (2008) The Perspective of the Acting Person. Washington DC: Catholic University Press.
[14] Habermas J (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon Press
[15] Ranisch R (2012) Impersonalism in bioethics. American J Bioethics. 12(8):40-41.
[16] Pope Francis. Laudato Si: On Care for our Common Home. Vatican City: Vatican City Press.


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