Doesn’t time fly when you’re
having fun? Amid all the fun and excitement of social distancing, lockdown,
wondering whether my family and friends will still be alive next month, and
drinking in the afternoon, I quite forgot that yesterday was Sunday.
Nevertheless,
for your edification and entertainment, we have the next and nearly the last
part of our epic cosmological experiment; and only a mere 24 hours later than
intended, give or take an hour or two.
3.1 The Grand Metaphysical
Experiment Continues!
Conscious participation in
willing the will of an Ideal Other aligns the self with its own ideals. Only then can it fulfil its potential
humanity. Interaction; and the
projection of mutual projects; even the form of mutual address: these provide a
religious consciousness with direct experience of the divine Will in action. What, after all, could be more divine, Farrer
asked, ‘than… the fire of genius, the steadfastness of virtue, the
unselfishness of love?’ This is the realisation of first “being” in and as
personal doing. ‘These things are not
merely the masterpieces of God’s hand, they are the sole revealers of his nature.’ Without the aspiration to imitate and embody
them, we have no concept of the divine; for ‘if the highest, most voluntary
part of human behaviour is not the act of God, then nowhere in the universe do
we directly meet the divine love.’
That love is
reflected in the conscious re-appropriation of a dialectic which inspirits
us. By reconstructing the dialectic in
which it first becomes, consciousness uncouples itself from self-limitation,
re-enacting itself as self-conscious transaction with transcendent ideas and
ideals. Simply put, participate in the
becoming of another and we participate in the divine mode.
Clearly, then,
consciousness can’t be constrained to determinate patterns of physical
operation. ‘[O]ur voluntary powers’ are
not, Farrer reminds us, ‘fixed to a single level of performance, or a set range
of concerns.’ Feuerbach’s point in a
nutshell. If the cosmos is, as Huxley
maintains, full partner in consciousness then the mythico-religious mind shall
countenance no constraint on personal participations. For a ‘limited consciousness,’ Feuerbach
declared, ‘is no consciousness’ at all; no consciousness of the cosmos or its interpersonal affirmations, that
is. ‘Consciousness, in the strict or
proper sense, is identical with the consciousness of the infinite’. The
infinite nature of consciousness lies in conscious appropriation of and by the dialectic. In such transcendent ideals we see our own
reflection; the image of consciousness cognising and re-cognising, thereby realising, itself as an expression of
infinite creativity. That means ‘nothing
else than the consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness; or, in the
consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object the
infinity of his own nature’.
So
consciousness coincides with religious consciousness. Recognising its own “infinitude”, the “self”
re-conceives itself as essentially transcendent or transactional. As the
sciences have ably shown, consciousness of the infinite finds its apotheosis in
our active exploration of the world.
By the 19th
Century, when Feuerbach was writing, the sciences had already made a bid for
omniscience. Through telescope and microscope, he observed, we had begun to
count ‘the stars in the sky, the ova in the spawn of fish and butterflies, and
the colour spots on the wings of insects’. And while one has her gaze fixed on
Venus, or the intestines of a caterpillar, someone somewhere is looking at
Uranus.
Such
“objective” explorations, of course, reflect another more primal, more personal
one: the participation in the other, which constitutes my own
self-construction. In plain, Feuerbachian, speech, limitation lies in
isolation; in combination and participation, we strive for the infinite. In participation, the infinite supplies the
conditions for becoming as overcoming. As consciousness extends itself indefinitely,
overcoming and appropriating the impersonal obstacles presented by a physical
universe, so religious consciousness extends itself infinitely, overcoming the
separation of “self” and other. The
“self” is literally embodied in the acts of the other. Oriented towards the open horizon of its own
realisation, consciousness transcends its self.
That’s why
Feuerbach saw the reflection of divinity enacted in the transactions of consciousness.
It’s also why human ideals are not ‘merely theoretical, inert conception[s];’
they are essentially practical, ‘calling me to action, to imitation.’
Constructed in the image of the other, Susan Langer notes, projections of
“perfectibility” reflect actual aspirations: modes of action worthy of
replication. Hence, those of us who
strive to embody them, follow by the light of their divinity. Grounding
aspirations and ideals in the vitality of concrete relation, Farrer remind us
that the wellspring of all physical and personal being is no ‘shy secret hidden
somewhere under the root of our mind….
God’s will is written across the face of the world.’ God is the ‘participated life.’ Invited to
imitate this divine Imago, our
cosmological projects reclaim the psychology from which they are born.
In an
amplificatory move which allowed Feuerbach to deny the charge of reductivism
and stake his claim to ‘exalt anthropology into theology’ the process of
imitation and investment drive the dialectics of consciousness “upwards”. In
doing so, they initiate the anthropological reconstruction of our cosmological
projects; they complete the ‘anthropotheistic’ drive of consciousness embodied
in both science and religion.
Anthropologising
cosmology and metaphysics like this is, of course, no mere anthropomorphic
projection. At best, such an obscure notion sees ‘the transposition of the
internal contents of consciousness into [or onto] the external world.’ But that
just constrains creative agency with the analogies used to conceive it,
condemning the conception – along with the relation it connotes – to be ‘what
our thought never quite overtakes.’ Such literal projections limit our
idealised conceptions, first by the range of immediate interactions predicable
of personal agents, and second, by the analogies we use to overcome that
immediacy.
But even a
child wouldn’t be taken in by such an ontology.
Neither modern physics nor modern metaphysics imagines, in their
innocence, that the creative action of the cosmos is a person; no more, says Langer, than our primitive ancestors
imagined celestial bodies were. Where they once saw the moon as a ‘round fire,
a shining disk’, we now recognise the universe as a ‘free-for-all of elemental
forces’. We recognise this but, like those mythical and metaphysically minded
ancestors, we see “personhood” in it; and, like them, what interests us are the ‘acts and
relationships… which carry out that significance.’ How else, she asks, should
mere empirical facts acquire importance and obviousness [but] from their
analogy to human relations and activities.
Anthropic
images are more than literal projection because our images and symbols don’t
just represent, they present, the
primal connections in which we become. This is not a personification of the
cosmos, it’s a cosmologising of consciousness.
And so we reach another ill-timed and ill-judged cliff-hanger. If you survive another week, however, remember to come back next week for the final finale! Probably!
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